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Abstract 
    Insurance industry, whose wealthy development means great significance to a 
country’s social stability and economic development, is one of the backbone 
industries of modern finance. However, because of significant asymmetric 
information in insurance market, insurance fraud appears since the birth date of 
insurance. Nowadays, insurance fraud has taken place more and more and has become 
one of the greatest threats of insurance development. Using the game of theory and 
asymmetric information, this thesis analyzes insurance fraud in insurance market. 
Through the establishment of corresponding game models, we get some valuable 
suggestions against insurance fraud. There are five chapters in this paper: 
The first chapter is to expound the research backgrounds and purposes of this 
paper, summarize the domestic and foreign research relating to insurance fraud and 
elaborate the structure of this article. 
The second chapter is to make a general discussion about the subject of this 
thesis- insurance fraud. First of all, define the insurance fraud to clear the object of 
study; second, expound insurance fraud’s forms and harms. 
The third chapter is about asymmetric information and related game theory. 
Insurance fraud which is caused by asymmetric information can by divided into 
adverse selection and moral hazard. This chapter discusses the contents of the above 
and makes a brief exposition about related game theory. 
The fourth chapter is about the analysis of the game models of insurance fraud. 
This chapter establishes adverse selection and moral hazard model respectively. 
Through analysis of the game models, get to research how to reduce insurance fraud. 
The fifth chapter is about policy recommendations. On the basis of preceding 
analysis, this chapter brings up the measures to reduce insurance fraud combining the 
actual situation of our country. 
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